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Federal Interventions in Private Enterprise
in the United States: Their Genesis in and Effects
on Corporate Finance Instruments and Transactions
∗

Joan MacLeod Heminway

“[D]ealmakers would do well to take a step back during this
downturn and rethink their own strategy based on the lessons of
the government’s actions and recent events. Forms should be
rethought and redrafted, and dealmakers should rethink
1
fundamental deal structures and financing arrangements . . . .”

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, in response to an international financial
meltdown, state governments intervened in economies all over the
world. As a result, government and business are interconnected in
more numerous ways than perhaps ever before. Governments have
increased their regulatory control over businesses in financial services
and other sectors; businesses assist governments in implementing
regulation; and governments are directly and indirectly engaged in
financing businesses that had been conducted through nongovernmental entities.
The United States exemplifies this new public-private archetype.
[E]ven as the . . . paradigm semi-nationalized some traditional
private financial services in the United States, it also contributed
to the privatization of government functions, which, during this
period, were in many ways “run like a business” rather than as a

∗

College of Law Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee
College of Law; J.D., New York University School of Law; A.B., Brown University. I
am indebted to Steve Davidoff and David Zaring, whose article, cited infra note 2,
along with the follow-on book written by Steve, cited infra note 1, provided the
impetus for this Article. In addition, each took time to read an earlier draft of this
Article. I also owe thanks to George Kuney and Paul Harner, whose academic and
practice backgrounds inform the included discussion of the Chrysler LLC and
General Motors Company bankruptcy reorganizations.
1
STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF, GODS AT WAR 298 (2009).
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regulator. The government was doing deals and taking stakes in
2
profit-making institutions.

This Article focuses on the U.S. government’s engagement in and
3
with corporate finance as an example of this public-private
engagement.
In response to U.S. corporate failures involved in the current
global financial crisis, traditional corporate finance vehicles and tools
4
were widely used in new ways and for new purposes. Of course, one
object of the U.S. government’s investment and intervention in, and
exercise of influence over, private enterprise during the crisis was to
provide for or ensure the provision of adequate capital funding. But
its investment, intervention, and influence also represented a new
way to oversee and otherwise regulate key business enterprises in the
financial services and automotive sectors. A pair of scholar-authors
5
termed the phenomenon “regulation by deal.”
The flexibility of corporate finance instruments and transactions
has been a hallmark of U.S. corporate law and practice, and in that
sense, recent events are consistent with other chapters in the history
of corporate finance in the United States. Nonetheless, it is
important for us to look at recent public interventions in private
enterprise not merely as a continuation of the past but also as
different (and in some cases, new) breeds of corporate finance
transaction—especially since the government is an explicit or implicit
party. Moreover, strict scrutiny of these transactions may remind us
of forgotten benefits to, and expose flaws in, existing transaction
documents or structures.
The financial crisis-related transactions that illustrate these
points are too numerous to cover here in full. A sampling of
transactions, however, can begin to shed light on some of the
corporate finance issues that arise from the U.S. government’s recent
investments, interventions, and influence in and over corporate
finance. Accordingly, this Article reviews certain aspects of the use of
preferred stock, bankruptcy-related proceedings, and mergers and
acquisitions in connection with the government’s recent, crisis-mode
2
Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response
to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468–69 (2009).
3
The term “corporate finance” is used broadly and includes all instruments and
transactions embodying or providing for the inflow, transformation, or utilization of
capital in a business entity (e.g., corporation, LLC, etc.).
4
DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 246 (“The government dealmakers and their lawyers
used the enormous power of government to structure some truly novel deals that
stretched the law to the breaking point at times.”).
5
See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 2, at 463.
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interventions in private enterprise. Further, it analyzes corporate
finance aspects of these exploits and highlights potential effects of
these activities on corporate finance instruments, transactions, and
legal practice.
II. REGULATION THROUGH PREFERRED STOCK PURCHASES
Beginning with its commitment to acquire a 79.9% voting and
dividend interest in American International Group, Inc. (AIG) in
6
September 2008, the United States, acting through the Department
of the Treasury, invested in newly designated and issued series of
preferred stock in various financial services firms as part of its bailout
plan. For example, as part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP), the U.S. Treasury invested in, among other iconic American
banking corporations, Bank of America Corporation (BoA) and
7
Citigroup Inc. (Citigroup), in addition to AIG.
The U.S.
government purchased twenty billion dollars worth of preferred stock
8
in BoA and Citigroup alone.
The U.S. government’s TARP investments replaced an earlier
plan to bail out failing banks exclusively through the purchase of
9
“mortgage-related assets.”
Predictably, taxpayers and investors
reacted adversely to this plan, which they perceived as both creating
enhanced moral hazard and leaving the U.S. government (and,
10
therefore, taxpayers) unprotected.
The U.S. government’s
preferred stock investments in financial services firms gave it a
current, long-term financial and, to some extent, governance stake in
the recovery of these systemically important firms. As a result, these
investments curbed moral hazard and better protected U.S.
government interests. Moreover, the preferred stock investments
ranked ahead of the publicly traded common stock of these entities
6
DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 257; Darla Mercado, AIG Announces Preferred Stock
Issue,
INVESTMENT
NEWS,
(Sept.
26,
2008,
6:13
PM),
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20080926/REG/809269948.
A trust
created for the benefit of the U.S Treasury made the AIG investment. See William K.
Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 964–65 (2009).
7
OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT: THE TROUBLED
ASSET
RELIEF
PROGRAM
(TARP)
7
(2009),
available
at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/09%20OFS_CitizensReport%20MAR2.pdf.
8
Id.
9
See Edward V. Murphy & Baird Webel, Proposal to Allow Treasury to Buy MortgageRelated Assets to Address Financial Instability, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Sept. 22, 2008, at 2,
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110286.pdf; see also
DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 265.
10
See Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 14, 2008, at A1.
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on the priority ladder, could be issued without shareholder approval,
and could be constructed to have debt-like features. In sum,
preferred stock was the most suitable available financial instrument
for these investments and proved to be a flexible tool in the federal
bailout.
This Part of the Article describes both the corporate authority to
designate and issue the preferred stock that enabled the U.S.
government to make these equity investments and significant terms
and provisions of the preferred stock issued, using AIG, BoA, and
Citigroup as key examples. The description of these facets of the
government’s preferred stock investments provides relevant legal
details important to corporate finance practitioners and other key
participants in capital-raising transactions. In addition, it illuminates
the legal aspects of corporate finance that make preferred stock an
advantageous investment vehicle in the bailout and in other capital
investment situations.
A

Blank Check Authority to Designate a Series of Preferred Stock
11

AIG, BoA, and Citigroup are Delaware corporations.
The
certificate of incorporation (or charter) for each corporation, as in
effect on the date of the applicable preferred stock investment by the
U.S. government, authorized the issuance of preferred stock (as well
as common stock) and authorized its board of directors to designate
different series of preferred stock and to determine the terms and
12
provisions of those designated series.
This type of authority,
11

See American International Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A) (Mar.
31,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/
000095012310030851/y83597e10vkza.htm; Bank of America Corporation, Annual
Report
(Form
10-K)
(Feb.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312510041666/d10k.htm;
Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000120677410000406/citi_10k.ht
m.
12
See American International Group, Inc., Certificate of Incorporation Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at Ex. 3(i) (Mar. 28, 1997), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/0000950123-97-002720.txt
[hereinafter AIG CoI]; Bank of America Corporation, Amended and Restated
Certificate of Incorporation (Form 10-Q), at Ex. 3(a) (Nov. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312508228086/dex3a.htm
[hereinafter BoA CoI]; Citigroup Inc., Certificate of Incorporation Quarterly Report
(Form
10-Q),
at
Ex.
3.01
(Nov.
12,
1998),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/0001047469-98-040485.txt
[hereinafter Citigroup CoI]; see also Sjostrom, supra note 6, at 977 (“AIG was and is
able to issue the . . . preferred stock without stockholder approval in accordance with
Delaware law because its authorized capital stock includes six million shares of ‘Serial
Preferred Stock” for which the board of directors is empowered, as contemplated by
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permitted under section 151 of the General Corporation Law of the
13
State of Delaware, is known as “blank check authority,” and the
preferred stock authorized under that authority often is referred to as
14
“blank check” preferred stock.
Blank check authority to issue preferred stock allows a
15
corporation to be more nimble in obtaining equity financing.
Absent blank check authority, a corporation must amend its
certificate of incorporation in order to establish new classes or series
16
of preferred stock, and that amendment requires both board and
17
stockholder votes under Delaware law. Given the requirements that
must be met under state and federal law in connection with a public
company stockholder vote (e.g., advance notice of the meeting and
the creation and filing of proxy materials), an amendment to a
18
certificate of incorporation may take several months to accomplish.
section 151(a) of Delaware General Corporation Law, to fix the rights, preferences,
and limitations.”).
13
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2010).
14
See Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder
Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 609 (2003) (“Blank check preferred stock contains
open terms that can be specified by the board at the time it is issued.”); J. Robert
Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete Candor: Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of
the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 641, 644 n.12 (2003) (“Blank-check preferred
stock provisions allowed management to issue new classes of shares without
shareholder approval.”); John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses:
Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1357 (2001) (referencing “blank check”
authority to issue preferred stock); John H. Matheson & Jon R. Norberg, Hostile Share
Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework for Evaluating Antitakeover Activities,
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 460 n.198 (1986) (“‘Blank check’ preferred is stock
authorized by the shareholders, the rights and preferences of which may be
determined by the board of directors at a later date.”).
15
See Matheson & Norberg, supra note 14, at 460 n.198 (“The ostensible purpose
for a board to secure authorization for ‘blank check’ preferred stock traditionally was
to give the board flexibility in securing financing for the corporation.”). It also
allows corporations other flexibility in using preferred stock—e.g., in fending off
takeovers. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 14, at 1357 (noting the use of blank check
preferred stock as part of a poison pill device).
16
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2010).
17
Id. § 242(b).
18
The Delaware corporate law statute on the timing of notices for stockholder
meetings reads as follows:
Unless otherwise provided in this chapter, the written notice of any
meeting shall be given not less than 10 nor more than 60 days before
the date of the meeting to each stockholder entitled to vote at such
meeting as of the record date for determining the stockholders
entitled to notice of the meeting.
Id. § 222(b). The federal proxy rule on the filing of proxy materials provides that
[f]ive preliminary copies of the proxy statement and form of proxy
shall be filed with the Commission at least 10 calendar days prior to the
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Accordingly, blank check authority was critical to the government’s
ability to quickly purchase stock in AIG, BoA, Citigroup, and other
19
troubled corporations as part of its bailout strategy.
The drafting of the blank check provision is different in each of
the applicable certificates of incorporation. BoA’s certificate of
incorporation, in effect at the time the U.S. government invested,
included a short, and seemingly limited, blank check authorization:
The Board of Directors of the Corporation shall have full power
and authority to establish one or more series within the class of
preferred shares (the “Preferred Shares”), to define the
designations, preferences, limitations and relative rights
(including conversion rights) of shares within such class and to
20
determine all variations between series.

The BoA blank check provision does not track the language in
section 151(a) of the General Corporation Law of the State of
21
Delaware that permits the grant of blank check authority.
The
statutory text allows for the board to establish, by resolution, a class or
series of preferred stock having specified “voting powers, full or
limited, or no voting powers, and . . . designations, preferences and
relative, participating, optional or other special rights, and
22
qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof.”
The Delaware
statute provides that the board’s power to designate series of
preferred stock arises from “authority expressly vested in it by the
23
provisions of its certificate of incorporation.”
Notably, the BoA blank check provision fails to mention the
authority to establish voting powers. The reference to “relative
24
rights” in the BoA provision may not cover voting powers because
both terms are separately used in the statute and the statute does not
indicate that voting powers are relative rights or that relative rights
include voting powers. Moreover, the term “all variations between
date definitive copies of such material are first sent or given to security
holders, or such shorter period prior to that date as the Commission
may authorize upon a showing of good cause thereunder.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (2010). The proxy materials typically are distributed with
the notice of meeting.
19
See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1 at 257–58.
20
BoA CoI, supra note 12.
21
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2010).
22
Id. The same provision summarizes this list defining the scope of the board’s
permissive authority as the power to determine the “voting powers, designations,
preferences, rights and qualifications, limitations or restrictions” of a class or series of
preferred stock. Id.
23
Id. (emphasis added).
24
BoA CoI, supra note 12.

HEMINWAY_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

FEDERAL INTERVENTIONS

11/8/2010 4:02 PM

1493

25

series” in BoA’s certificate of incorporation does not seem sufficient
to expressly provide for board authority to designate a series of
preferred stock including voting powers. The language in the blank
check provision of BoA’s certificate of incorporation, which fails to
clearly, expressly authorize the board of directors to determine the
voting powers of a series of preferred stock, is important; in Waggoner
26
v. Laster, the Delaware Supreme Court found that generalized text
in a blank check charter provision was insufficient to grant the board
of directors authority to establish voting powers in designating a
27
series of preferred stock under Delaware law. Despite the omission
from the BoA certificate of incorporation of clear, express director
authority to determine the voting powers of a series of preferred
stock, the terms of the BoA preferred stock purchased by the U.S.
28
government included voting rights.
The blank check authority provisions for AIG and Citigroup are
different and more detailed than that of BoA. Each certificate of
incorporation includes a general grant of authority to the board of
directors to designate and determine the terms and provisions of
series of preferred stock. This general statement of authority is
accompanied in each case by a nonexclusive list of authorized terms
and provisions that more precisely defines the scope of the board’s
29
authority. For example, each blank check provision authorizes the
board to determine for each series: the distinctive designation
number of shares, voting rights, dividend rights, redemption rights,
30
conversion rights, and rights on liquidation or dissolution.
The
language in the two certificates of incorporation defining these
25

Id.
581 A.2d 1127 (Del. 1990).
27
The court concluded as follows:
The power to establish voting rights was conspicuously absent from the
enumerated rights and powers granted the board. While that omission
may have been accidental, given the requirements of Delaware law this
Court cannot presume so and thereafter supply the missing provisions.
Under the rule of strict construction, any ambiguity must be resolved
against granting preferences, rights or powers.
Id. at 1135. Admittedly, the provision at issue in the Waggoner case also included
language limiting voting rights to the common stockholders unless otherwise
provided in the statute or in a resolution adopted by the board of directors, which is
different from the more broad language in the BoA provision. Id. at 1130. The
nature of any resolution approved by the board in Waggoner was unclear. Id. at 1132.
28
See infra notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text. Earlier designated series of
preferred stock also purportedly afford stockholders voting rights. See BoA CoI, supra
note 12.
29
See AIG CoI, supra note 12; Citigroup CoI, supra note 12.
30
Id.
26
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specific authorizations is, however, different in a number of respects
31
not relevant here. Moreover, in addition to the express authority
afforded to the board to determine specific provisions, each blank
check provision includes a catchall authorization allowing the board
to determine, in AIG’s case, “[a]ny other relative rights, preferences
or limitations of the shares of the series not inconsistent herewith or
32
with applicable law” or, in the case of Citigroup, “[a]ny other
relative, participating, optional or other special rights, qualifications,
33
limitations or restrictions of that series.”
The risk of employing a detailed list of powers and rights in
drafting blank check authority provisions for corporate charters is
that by setting forth each feature of preferred stock that the board is
authorized to determine, a corporation may inadvertently leave a
desired feature of the preferred stock off the list or otherwise
unintentionally limit the board’s authority to establish the terms of a
future class or series of preferred stock. To the extent that the
omitted feature is not adequately covered by non-exclusivity
provisions or a catchall provision, any designation by the board of
directors of a new series of preferred stock with that feature would be
unauthorized—ultra vires. The AIG certificate of incorporation and
the Citigroup certificate of incorporation each include all of the key
attributes of preferred stock set forth in the statute, although (as
noted above) the precise wording for each is different from that for
the other. While in each of these corporate charters (the AIG and
Citigroup certificates of incorporation) the specific wording of each
listed term (or attribute) is broad, individual facts may raise questions
about the extent of the board’s authority in providing for terms and
provisions of a particular class or series of preferred stock.
Accordingly, although drafting in the AIG, BoA, and Citigroup
certificates of incorporation did not impede the U.S. government’s
preferred stock investments, none of the blank check authorizations
sampled here is optimally constructed. To offer a board the
maximum flexibility in establishing a series of preferred stock and
determining its terms and provisions and to forestall litigation over
detailed lists regarding permitted terms (even if the lists are selfdescribed as nonexclusive and are inclusive of a broad catchall
provision), a drafter of blank check charter authority should use the
precise words in the general blank check authority provision of the
relevant corporate statute without embellishment. This type of blank
31
32
33

Id.
AIG CoI, supra note 12.
Citigroup CoI, supra note 12.
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check authority, a form of which is included in many certificates of
incorporation for Delaware corporations, would read as follows:
The corporation may issue Preferred Stock from time to time in
one or more series as the Board of Directors may establish by the
adoption of a resolution or resolutions relating thereto, each
series to have such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting
powers, and such designations, preferences and relative,
participating, optional or other special rights, and qualifications,
limitations or restrictions thereof, as shall be stated and expressed
in the resolution or resolutions providing for the issue of such
series adopted by the Board of Directors pursuant to authority to
do so, which authority is hereby granted to the Board of
34
Directors.

Of course, if the legislature amends the statute after the certificate of
incorporation is filed, this approach may not continue to provide the
all-inclusive authority intended by the drafter after the statutory
amendment becomes effective. But statutory amendments also are
likely to wreak similar havoc with other drafting approaches.
B. Stock Exchange Authority to Issue Preferred Stock
State corporate authority was not the only authority needed to
issue and sell preferred stock to the U.S. government as part of the
federal financial bailout. Stock exchange rules applicable to listed
companies also may govern the authority of a corporation in issuing
35
preferred stock. For example, the relevant rule of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE)—on which AIG, BoA, and Citigroup each
have listed securities—provides that, subject to certain exceptions not
applicable to the U.S. government’s preferred stock investments in
AIG, BoA, or Citigroup,
34
Honeywell International Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation (Form 8-K), at Ex. 3(i) (Apr. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773840/000093041310002190/c61318_ex
3-i.htm. This provision includes the appropriate words from the statute, but could be
drafted better in other respects (e.g., to economize on verbiage and to eliminate the
use of “thereto” and “hereby”).
35
See NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 5635(d) (2009) available at
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode
=chp%5F1%5F1%5F4%5F2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrul
es%2F; N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED CO. MANUAL § 312.03 (2002), available at
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5
F1%5F4%5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F [hereinafter
NYSE MANUAL]. The Model Business Corporation Act also includes a shareholder
approval provision for large stock issuances. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(f)
(2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/library/onlinepublications/
mbca2002.pdf.
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[s]hareholder approval is required prior to the issuance of
common stock, or of securities convertible into or exercisable for
common stock, in any transaction or series of related transactions
if:
(1) the common stock has, or will have upon issuance, voting
power equal to or in excess of 20 percent of the voting power
outstanding before the issuance of such stock or of securities
convertible into or exercisable for common stock; or
(2) the number of shares of common stock to be issued is, or will
be upon issuance, equal to or in excess of 20 percent of the
number of shares of common stock outstanding before the
issuance of the common stock or of securities convertible into or
36
exercisable for common stock.

The rules, however, also include a provision allowing for exceptions
from this shareholder approval requirement.
Exceptions may be made . . . upon application to the Exchange
when (1) the delay in securing stockholder approval would
seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise and
(2) reliance by the company on this exception is expressly
approved by the Audit Committee of the Board.
A company relying on this exception must mail to all
shareholders not later than 10 days before issuance of the
securities a letter alerting them to its omission to seek the
shareholder approval that would otherwise be required under the
policy of the Exchange and indicating that the Audit Committee
37
of the Board has expressly approved the exception.

The U.S. government initially acquired convertible preferred
stock in AIG representing, on an as-converted basis, 77.9% of the
38
aggregate voting power of AIG’s shares of common stock.
AIG
39
relied on the exception to issue these shares of preferred stock.
36

NYSE MANUAL, supra note 35, at § 312.03(c). A similar exception exists under
the NASDAQ Listing Rules. NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES §5635(f) (Mar. 15,
2010), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.
asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F1%5F4%5F2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnas
daq%2Dequityrules%2F.
37
NYSE MANUAL, supra note 35, at § 312.05.
38
American International Group, Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 3.3 (Mar.
5, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/00009501
2309004097/y75051e8vk.htm.
39
Steven M. Davidoff, The A.I.G. Bailout Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept.
24, 2008, 9:32 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/the-aigbailout-takes-shape.
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However, AIG did not have enough underlying common stock to
40
satisfy the conversion feature of the preferred stock. As a result, AIG
needed to seek stockholder approval for an amendment to its
certificate of incorporation authorizing additional shares of common
41
stock for issuance upon conversion of the preferred stock.
The
certificate of designation for this series of preferred stock conditions
the U.S. government’s conversion rights on the filing of the
42
amendment to AIG’s certificate of incorporation.
Exceptions from the stockholder approval requirement for large
43
This is because it is hard to
stock issuances generally are rare.
determine and prove that a “delay in securing stockholder approval
44
would seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise.”
The meanings of “seriously jeopardize” and “financial viability” in this
context are not well established. Moreover, the NYSE does not
publicize guidelines used by its representatives in responding to
exemption requests.

40
See Lawrence Cunningham, AIG’s Unsupervised Capital Structure Conflicts,
Concurring
Opinions
(Mar.
23,
2009,
11:52
PM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/03/aigs_unsupervis_1.html
(“AIG’s charter authorizes it to issue only 5 billion common shares and 3 billion of
those already are outstanding. That does not leave enough common shares to enable
the preferred to be converted so that it would command more than 40% of the total
voting power.”); Steven M. Davidoff, Sizing up A.I.G.’s New Bailout, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK
(Nov.
10,
2008,
10:48
AM),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/sizing-up-aigs-new-bailout/
(describing the need for shareholder approval of additional authorized shares to
cover commitments under the preferred stock). Cf. American International Group,
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Item 1.01 (Sept. 26, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012308011496/y71452e8vk.
htm (indicating that the preferred shares would not be convertible until shareholder
approval for the underlying common shares is received).
41
American International Group, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (June 5,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/00009304
1309003116/c57286_def14a.htm; see DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 258.
42
American International Group, Inc., Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation (Form S-3), at Ex. 3(i)(a) (June 30, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012309023187/y75649exv3w
iwa.htm.
43
See Melissa Klein Aguilar, Mutual Recognition; NYSE Shareholder Approval; More,
WEEK,
(Apr.
8,
2008),
http://www.complianceweek.com/
COMPLIANCE
article/4066/mutual-recognition-nyse-shareholder-approval-more (referring to the
exception as “rarely used” and “infrequently utilized”).
44
See NYSE MANUAL, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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Since 2008, however, AIG and other issuers of securities have
45
successfully availed themselves of the financial viability exception.
The significant number of successful applications for exceptions
during the financial crisis, while not precedential, offers future
issuers in corporate finance transactions a series of realistic models
for use in decision-making and drafting. Although the exact
circumstances of the financial crisis are unlikely to recur in the
future, the exceptions granted during the crisis help both issuers and
the NYSE identify various coexisting conditions that may warrant an
exception in similar economic times or for analogous issuers.
Advisors have begun to recognize the value of the increased use of
the exception, resulting in at least one firm publicizing guidelines for
46
use of the exemption by issuers.
C. Terms and Provisions of Preferred Stock Issued to the U.S.
Government
The U.S. government purchased or otherwise acquired multiple
series of preferred stock in AIG, BoA, and Citigroup as part of the
47
federal bailout of financial services firms. These series of preferred
stock have varied terms and provisions based on their purpose in the
bailout of each issuer, the constraints on each issuer (including, for
example, capital requirements for the bank issuers and other
regulatory restrictions on the issuers), parameters set by the U.S.
government, as the investor, and the negotiations between the
government and each issuer. Moreover, the U.S. government’s initial

45
Aguilar, supra note 43 (“In the first week of March, MoneyGram, Bear Stearns,
Thornburg Mortgage, and AbitibiBowater all announced or closed investments in
reliance on the provision.”).
46
See Sanjay Shirodkar & Michael Reed, How to Do a Deal Without Shareholder
Approval: The Financial Viability Exception, NEWS & INSIGHTS, DLA PIPER, July 28, 2008,
available at http://www.dlapiper.com/financial_viability_exception.
47
See American International Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 21
(Feb. 26, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/
000104746910001465/a2196553z10-k.htm (mentioning the beneficial interest of the
U.S. Department of the Treasury in the Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating
Preferred Stock); id. at 311 (mentioning the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
ownership of Series D, Series E, and Series F preferred Stock); Bank of America
Corporation,
Form
10-K
at
53)
(Feb.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312510041666/d10k.htm
(mentioning the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s ownership of Cumulative
Perpetual Preferred Stock Series N, Series Q, and Series R); Citigroup Inc., Annual
Report
(Form
10-K),
at
192
(Feb.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000120677410000406/citi_10k.ht
m (mentioning the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s ownership of Series H and
Series I Cumulative Preferred Stock).
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investments occurred over time in several tranches, and as a result,
each party (investor and issuer) has had the opportunity to refine its
48
purposes as the investments have evolved.
The various terms of
each series are too numerous to set out in full here, but the nature
and extent of the variations are easily illustrated by summarizing a
few of the provisions from the early preferred stock issuances.
As in corporate finance transactions generally, there are tensions
among the terms and provisions of each security between enabling
the issuer to survive and (hopefully) thrive and enabling the
investor(s) to make an adequate return and exercise some
governance control over the issuer and the investment. In distressed
investment situations like this, the investor typically “holds the
cookie”—the bargaining leverage or power; the investor has what the
issuer desperately wants. Unlike some corporate finance transactions,
however, the negotiations over the U.S. government’s preferred stock
investments and their outcome were all quite public, and the
interested investor base included not only the U.S. government, as
the record holder, but also U.S. taxpayers.
These factors
undoubtedly changed the nature of the negotiations and, in turn, the
nature of the securities themselves.
The summary of sample terms in the U.S. government’s
preferred stock instruments set forth below underscores a very
important part of preferred stock as an instrument of corporate
finance—its flexibility as a statutorily ordained and contractually
implemented form of equity investment. When properly authorized
and implemented, leaving aside tax considerations (which often play
a strong role in the debt-versus-equity debate), preferred stock—
especially convertible preferred stock—may be an optimal instrument
of corporate finance in certain corporate finance contexts. Both
equity-oriented and debt-like terms can be combined in the same
instrument—an instrument well grounded in both statutory law and
the corporate charter. Issuer and investor interests can be delicately
balanced, and seemingly infinite possibilities for combinations and
contents of provisions exist. Note, as you read through the summary
below, the convergence and divergence of basic terms in even these
few sample securities.

48

See generally Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in Banks: Creeping
Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 409, 410–21 (2009)
(describing the actual and potential phases of the government bailout of U.S.
banking institutions).
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Voting Rights

Voting rights are present in all of the series of preferred stock
49
AIG, BoA, and Citigroup issued to the U.S. government. Generally,
each share of AIG Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating
Preferred Stock has the same number of votes it would have if it were
converted into common stock and votes together with the common
50
stock. The shares of AIG Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual
Preferred Stock, however, have special class voting rights, including
51
watchdog director election rights in the event of a dividend
arrearage of four quarters and entitlement to a 66 % supermajority
vote on: the authorization of senior and pari passu equity;
amendments to the terms of the Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative
Perpetual Preferred Stock or the certificate of incorporation that
adversely affect the shares of the series; and share exchanges,
reclassifications, mergers, and consolidations (subject to certain
52
exceptions). Each holder is “entitled to one vote for each $10,000
of liquidation preference to which such holder’s shares are
53
The shares of BoA Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual
entitled.”
Preferred Stock, Series N, have watchdog director election rights in
the event of a dividend arrearage of six quarters and entitlement to a
66 % supermajority vote on: the authorization of senior (but not
pari passu) equity; amendments to the terms of the Fixed Rate
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N, or the certificate of
incorporation that adversely affect the shares of the series; and share
exchanges, reclassifications, mergers, and consolidations (subject to

49

For a general discussion of voting rights in the U.S. government’s TARP
investments, see Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: Regulating Public
Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1636491_code348985.pdf?abstr
actid=1636491&mirid=1.
50
See American International Group, Inc., Certificate of Designations of Series C
Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock (Form 10-Q), at Ex. 3(i)(a)
(May 7, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/
000095012309008272/y76976exv3wiwa.htm [hereinafter AIG Series C CoD].
51
“Watchdog” directors in this context are directors elected by shareholders of a
class or series ostensibly to provide a monitoring function during a period of
significant dividend arrearages, as defined in the terms of the preferred stock. See
RICHARD T. MCDERMOTT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 345 (4th ed. 2006).
52
See American International Group, Inc., Certificate of Designations of Series D
Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock (Form 8-K), at Ex. 3.1 (Nov. 24,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012
308016447/y72888exv3w1.htm [hereinafter AIG Series D CoD].
53
Id.
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certain exceptions).
Each share affords the holder one vote.
Shares of the Citigroup Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred
Stock, Series I, have watchdog director election rights in the event of
a dividend arrearage of six quarters and entitlement to a 66
%
supermajority vote on: the authorization of senior (but not pari passu)
equity; amendments to the terms of the Fixed Rate Cumulative
Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series I, or the certificate of incorporation
that adversely affect the shares of the series; and share exchanges,
reclassifications, mergers, and consolidations (subject to certain
56
exceptions). These voting rights are like those for the BoA Fixed
57
Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N. Yet each
holder is “entitled to one vote for each $10,000 of liquidation
58
preference to which such holder’s shares are entitled,” like the
holders of shares of the AIG Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative
59
Perpetual Preferred Stock.
2.

Conversion Rights

Although the AIG Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating
Preferred Stock includes a conversion privilege exercisable at the
60
option of the U.S. government, shares of the AIG Series D Fixed
61
Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, BoA Fixed Rate
62
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N, and Citigroup
63
Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series I, are not
convertible. Optional conversion features in preferred stock that
permit investors to convert their preferred equity position into
common stock (like those included in the AIG Series C Perpetual,
Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock) offer investors the

54
See Bank of America Corporation, Certificate of Designations for the Series N
Preferred Stock (Form 8-K), at Ex. 3.1 (Oct. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312508220360/dex31.htm
[hereinafter BoA Series N CoD].
55
Id.
56
See Citigroup Inc., Certificate of Designations of Fixed Rate Cumulative
Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series I (Form 8-K), at Ex. 3.1 (Dec. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000095010308003069/dp12158_
ex0301.htm [hereinafter Citigroup Series I CoD].
57
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
58
See Citigroup Series I CoD, supra note 56.
59
See supra note 52 and text accompanying note 53.
60
See AIG Series C CoD, supra note 50.
61
See AIG Series D CoD, supra note 52.
62
See BoA Series N CoD, supra note 54.
63
See Citigroup Series I CoD, supra note 56.
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opportunity to trade their preferred position in terms of dividends
and liquidation for the more liquid, market-based upside potential of
the common stock on specified terms and under specified
64
conditions.
This general type of conversion provision is
distinguishable from mandatory conversion provisions commonly
used in venture capital preferred stock instruments, which operate to
automatically divest investors from their preference rights upon the
occurrence of a specific event (commonly an initial public offering or
65
a change-in-control transaction).
3.

Redemption Rights

Shares of the AIG Series C Perpetual, Convertible, Participating
66
Preferred Stock are not redeemable. Shares of the AIG Series D
Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock are redeemable at a
redemption price equal to the shares’ liquidation preference plus,
subject to certain exceptions, the amount of any accrued and unpaid
dividends under certain specified circumstances involving a lack of
67
control of AIG by the U.S. government. Shares of BoA Fixed Rate
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N, may not be
redeemed prior to the first dividend payment date falling on or after
the third anniversary of the date the shares were originally issued
(subject to certain exceptions), but may be redeemed after that time
under specified conditions relating to bank authority approvals at a
redemption price equal to the shares’ liquidation preference plus
(subject to certain exceptions) the amount of any accrued and
68
unpaid dividends.
And finally, shares of Citigroup Fixed Rate
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series I, may be redeemed
under specified conditions relating to bank authority approvals on or
after the date on which the shares of the Citigroup Fixed Rate
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series H, have been
redeemed, at a redemption price equal to the shares’ liquidation

64

See Marcel Kahan, Anti-Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 2 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 147, 147 (1995); John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance
Market: A Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising
Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 892-93 (2005).
65
See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure:
A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 881 n.26, 882
(2003).
66
See AIG Series C CoD, supra note 50.
67
See AIG Series D CoD, supra note 52.
68
See BoA Series N CoD, supra note 54.
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preference plus (subject to certain exceptions) the amount of any
69
accrued and unpaid dividends.
4.

Dividend Rights

Dividends are payable on the shares of the AIG Series C
Perpetual, Convertible, Participating Preferred Stock together with
70
dividends paid on AIG’s common stock. Dividends also are payable
on the AIG Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred
Stock, BoA Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series
N, and Citigroup Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock,
71
Series I, but at specified rates and on specified dates. Dividends on
72
these three series are cumulative. “Cumulative rights to dividends
means that if the business misses dividend payments to the preferred
stockholders, the preferred stockholder has the right to receive back
(missed) dividends plus the current dividend before any dividends
73
are paid to the common stockholders.”
5.

Preferred Stock as a Flexible, Contractual Instrument

Even this brief summary of several of the key terms and
provisions of the various series of preferred stock issued to or for the
benefit of the U.S. government shows the incredible flexibility and
range of preferred stock as an instrument in corporate finance.
“[T]he terms of preferred stock are defined by contracts that may
74
have infinite variations on the theme.” As we can see from the
varied terms of each exemplar series described in the preceding
75
paragraphs, preferred stock is highly contractual, with few
69

See Citigroup Series I CoD, supra note 56.
See AIG Series C CoD, supra note 50.
71
See AIG Series D CoD, supra note 52; BoA Series N CoD, supra note 54;
Citigroup Series I CoD, supra note 56.
72
AIG Series D CoD, supra note 52; BoA Series N CoD, supra note 54; Citigroup
Series I CoD, supra note 56.
73
Richard A. Mann et al., Starting From Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide To Representing A
Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 819 (2004). “Non-cumulative preferred stock
means that the preferred stockholder loses dividend payments for any year in which
no dividends were paid.” Id. See also Michael A. Woronoff & Jonathan A. Rosen,
Effective vs Nominal Valuations in Venture Capital Investing, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 199, 217
(2005) (“If a dividend is non-cumulative it is not due unless declared. If not
declared for a particular period, the company owes no dividends for that period.
Because boards are unlikely to declare a dividend when not required to, 63 noncumulative dividends will typically not alter effective valuations.”).
74
D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, n.296 (2002).
75
Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932, 937 (Del. 1979) (“For most
purposes, the rights of the preferred shareholders as against the common
70
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constraints placed on it by the state corporate statutes that authorize
76
its use.
Preferred stock comes in many guises, and no single Platonic
form underlies its variety. Whatever its attributes (its “rights,
preferences, and privileges,” in the jargon), preferred stock is
quintessentially a matter of contract. If any deviation from the
attributes of the residual common stock concept is desired, the
contract must specify it. Of course this is only an imaginary
situation. Preferred stock not only needs to be defined by
contract, it is defined by contract—by definition, one is tempted
77
to say.

The terms and provisions of a class or series of preferred stock
are and must be respectfully treated as a legally binding contract: it is
the drafter’s responsibility to use this tool creatively and flexibly in
the service of client needs, and it is the courts’ responsibility to
interpret the drafter’s work product when its provisions are subject to
78
challenge.
Focused, comprehensive study of the terms and
provisions of the various series of preferred stock acquired by the
shareholders are fixed by the contractual terms agreed upon when the class of
preferred stock is created.”); Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 463 A.2d
642, 646 (Del. Ch. 1983) (“The preferential rights attaching to shares of preferred
stock are contractual in nature and are governed by the express provisions of a
corporation’s charter.”); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1564 (1989) (“[S]enior securities, both debt and preferred
stock, . . . frequently contain complicated contractual provisions relating to the
circumstances of voting, representation on the board of directors, conversion into
common stock, call protection, redemption exposure, dilution and other such
concerns.”).
76
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (2010).
77
Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1684 (1985).
78
Former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Veasey made precisely this
point and expanded on its meaning in a seminal corporate finance case:
Articulation of the rights of preferred stockholders is fundamentally
the function of corporate drafters. Construction of the terms of
preferred stock is the function of courts. This Court’s function is
essentially one of contract interpretation against the background of
Delaware precedent. These precedential parameters are simply stated:
Any rights, preferences and limitations of preferred stock that
distinguish that stock from common stock must be expressly and
clearly stated, as provided by statute. Therefore, these rights,
preferences and limitations will not be presumed or implied. The other
doctrine states that when there is a hopeless ambiguity attributable to
the corporate drafter that could mislead a reasonable investor such
ambiguity must be construed in favor of the reasonable expectations of
the investor and against the drafter.
Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852–53 (Del. 1998) (footnotes
omitted).
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U.S. government in the federal bailout—or any other grouping of
similarly situated securities—reminds corporate finance counsel of
the intricacies involved in drafting preferred stock and is sure to lead
drafters of corporate finance instruments to new insights about the
instruments that they draft in order to bring capital into the
corporation.
III. REGULATION THROUGH INTERVENTION IN BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATIONS
The U.S. government’s crisis regulation through corporate
finance extended beyond mere capital investment, however, and into
the realm of leverage over quasi-judicial process and transaction
partners and terms in the bankruptcy setting. Specifically, the
government used its position as an investor-regulator to intervene in
arrangements for the bankruptcy reorganizations of Chrysler LLC
(Chrysler) and General Motors Company (GM). The government’s
intervention shaped both the speed and certainty of these
reorganizations.
Chapter 11 bankruptcies often result in both the disruption of
existing capital structures of a business association and the
consummation of significant corporate finance transactions. In a
reorganization under Chapter 11, for example, the entire capital
structure of an entity may be altered by court order, or the
79
corporation’s assets may be sold to a new owner. Existing security
holders may have little say in all this and may have their equity
interests cancelled under the plan of reorganization pursuant to the
80
“absolute priority rule.” The debtor in possession’s power of the
pen (subject to court approval) is staggering, allowing it to overwrite
carefully crafted terms in corporate finance instruments and ordain
81
the terms and provisions of corporate finance transactions.
Both Chrysler and GM entered and exited bankruptcy in six
weeks or less—forty-two days for Chrysler and forty days for GM. In
79

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 1123, 1129 (2006). For a discussion of both the planfocused reorganization apparently contemplated by the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Code and the § 363 asset sale process that has evolved in practice, see George W.
Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process,
76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002) [hereinafter Kuney, Misinterpreting].
80
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (absolute priority rule).
81
See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (a)–(b) (specifying what a plan shall and may provide for,
including “merger or consolidation of the debtor with one or more persons; . . .
cancellation or modification of any indenture or similar instrument; . . . extension or
a maturity date or a change in an interest rate or other term of outstanding
securities; . . . amendment of the debtor’s charter”).
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each case, the U.S. government used its leverage as a powerful
82
regulator/investor to prompt and shape a particular outcome.
“Beyond their massive size, the automakers’ bankruptcies were
remarkable for the active role of the federal government in
encouraging the filings and charting the course of the proceedings—
circumstances leading to concerns that their bankruptcy cases were
83
unduly influenced by political actors.” Scholars now debate whether
84
this political intervention in business is extraordinary or desirable.
Undoubtedly, the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies represent
significant corporate finance events. Both entities quickly emerged
from bankruptcy reorganizations with different owners and capital
structures. In each case, the failure to fully respect the absolute
priority rule and the priority ladder (by, for example, shorting the
Indiana Teachers Pension Fund, a secured creditor, in favor of the
GM Pension Fund, a junior unsecured creditor and equity holder)
may increase uncertainty in the priority system and make investors
less willing to invest, as the terms of their deal may be unilaterally
changed in a Chapter 11 reorganization plan. It is important to
question whether the costs of this strategy and the related tactics are
so high that they have a deleterious effect on capital markets. Does
the overt or subtle favoring of some parties over others in a
bankruptcy like the Chrysler or GM bankruptcies create such an
unpalatable impression of unfairness that investment will be
discouraged?
Both the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies were conducted as asset
85
sales under § 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“§ 363 sales”).
According to certain commentators, although the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code is not clear on the requirements for § 363 sales in this context,
82
See John E. Kwoka, Jr., The U.S. Auto Industry Under Duress: Fit, or Finished?, 5
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 49, 68–69 (2009) (describing the two bankruptcies);
George W. Kuney, Vacating Chrysler, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 1 (2010)
(providing a critique of the Chrysler bankruptcy) [hereinafter Kuney, Vacating
Chrysler]; Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83
AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009) (assessing both bankruptcies); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel,
Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010) (criticizing the process
of the Chrysler bankruptcy).
83
Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62
STAN. L. REV. 747, 749 (2010). See also Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 696 (2010) (“The bankruptcies of both GM and
Chrysler were able to proceed at breakneck pace because one player—the United
States government—was able to dictate the terms of the proceedings.”).
84
Compare Lubben, supra note 82, with Roe & Skeel, supra note 82 (arguing these
points).
85
11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006). Professor Lubben has included a helpful summary of
the two Chapter 11 proceedings in his article cited supra note 82, at 536–39.
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the Chrysler and GM § 363 sales failed to rigorously enforce
applicable procedures designed to protect investors from or in the
86
event of a loss of priority in a reorganization plan.
A brief
description of the two bankruptcy processes is in order. As described
by Professors Mark Roe and David Skeel (in the case of the Chrysler
bankruptcy):
The deal’s basic structure is straightforward to summarize.
Prebankruptcy, Chrysler was a private firm, owned by Cerberus, a
large private equity fund. As of the bankruptcy, its two largest
creditors were secured creditors owed $ 6.9 billion and an
unsecured employee benefit plan, owed $ 10 billion. It also owed
trade creditors $ 5.3 billion, and it had warranty and dealer
obligations of several billion dollars.
The government created and funded a shell company that,
through a § 363 sale from Chrysler, bought substantially all of
Chrysler’s assets for $ 2 billion, giving the secured creditors a
return of 29 cents on the dollar. FIAT was brought in to manage
the new firm and was given a slice of the new company’s stock.
New Chrysler (formally: New CarCo Acquisition LLC) then
assumed the old company’s debts to the retirees, most dealers,
and trade creditors. The $ 10 billion of unsecured claims owed to
the retirees’ benefits plan were replaced with a new $ 4.6 billion
87
note as well as 55 percent of the new company’s stock.

The result?
Priority seemed violated. Unsecured retiree claims were
promised well over 50 cents on the dollar, along with control of
the New Chrysler, and unsecured trade creditors were promised
full payment. The secured creditors, however, were getting 29
cents on the dollar, and future products-liability claims relating to
Chrysler cars already on the road would receive nothing at all
under the plan, as the pseudo-sale made no provision for them.
Claims could be brought against only Old Chrysler, which was
88
expected to soon have no assets.
86

See Kuney, Vacating Chrysler, supra note 82, at 127; Roe & Skeel, supra note 82,
at 733–34, 770. Professors Roe and Skeel analyze the entire structure of the
transaction in detail in the body of their article. Id. at 734–51.
87
Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, at 733 (footnotes omitted); see also Templin, supra
note 49, at 42–45.
88
Id.; see also Templin, supra note 49, at 43 (“[T]he Obama administration’s
strategy was largely criticized because it interfered with the contractual rights of the
bondholders by favoring unions in the post-bankruptcy ownership. The pre-planned
bankruptcy plan advocated by the Obama Administration created a post-bankruptcy
ownership structure that favored the union-driven employment retirement funds
rather than bondholders.”) (footnote omitted).
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The GM bankruptcy, while more mainstream in some respects
than the Chrysler Chapter 11 proceedings, was built off the same
model.
The government used the same template for the § 363 sale in GM
as it did in Chrysler. As in Chrysler, the buyer was not a true third
party, the ostensible immediacy to the urgency of the sale was
debatable, and the § 363 bidding procedures required that wouldbe bidders agree to the retiree settlement negotiated by the
government and GM. But GM’s secured creditors, unlike their
counterparts in Chrysler, were paid in full. The GM sale was in this
dimension thus easier to reconcile with ordinary priority rules
89
than Chrysler.

The difference in the two cases is important. In the Chrysler
proceedings, the retirees and trade creditors got more, out of
priority, because the purchaser needed them to complete the
transaction. Conversely, the purchaser made a calculated judgment
that it could treat secured creditors and tort claimants in an inferior
manner and still complete the reorganization. It may well be that
Chrysler would have failed absent this disparate treatment. The same
type of disparate treatment did not occur in the GM Chapter 11
reorganization.
Yet these differences do not combat fears that the aberrant and
flawed abbreviated § 363 sale process used in the Chrysler bankruptcy
or the short-form process used in the GM bankruptcy will be used in
future Chapter 11 proceedings with similarly unfair or less fair
90
results. Professors Roe and Skeel note that the § 363 sale process
used in the Chrysler bankruptcy “sharply cut off” two creditor groups
and contend that the process affected capital markets by rewriting,
through the bankruptcy court’s actions, the essence of the Chapter
91
11 reorganization provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
The
89

Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, at 765.
See Id. at 731; see also Kuney, Vacating Chrysler, supra note 82, at 131 (“[T]he
Second Circuit’s Chrysler opinion had already been used to support confirmation of
a similar, but less draconian, section 363 transaction in the General Motors
reorganization case and was being cited in support of similar, fast-track
reorganization-by-sale transactions elsewhere.”); id. at 130–31 (discussing the effect
of the Supreme Court opinion vacating the Second Circuit’s opinion in the Chrysler
case).
91
See Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, at 729. In their conclusion, Professors Roe and
Skeel again articulate this relationship between the rules of the road in a Chapter 11
reorganization and the capital markets.
For minority creditors, there’s a century of bankruptcy and equityreceivership law designed to balance protection from the majority’s
potential to encroach on the minority and squeeze them out from their
contractual priority against the minority’s potential to hold out
90
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significant increase in volume of § 363 sales over the past ten to
92
fifteen years, together with pre-existing related process erosions in
93
the Chapter 11 context, certainly gives reason to reflect on the
possibility that Chrysler-type § 363 sales may proliferate. If Professors
Roe and Skeel and other like commentators are right (that the
Chrysler and GM bankruptcies represent a new form of abuse likely
to be repeated), now is the time to prevent the identified abuses of
94
process through legislation or judicial action.
Professor Stephen Lubben contests the negative views of
Professors Roe and Skeel (and others) on the Chrysler and GM § 363
sales and argues that the two § 363 sales were conducted in the
ordinary course of bankruptcy practice:
[T]he basic structure used to reorganize both GM and Chrysler
was not unprecedented. Indeed, it was entirely ordinary. In both
cases the “good” assets were sold to new entities. The
consideration for that sale goes to the “old” debtor, and will be
distributed according to the absolute priority rule. None of this
constitutes a covert reorganization plan or a corruption of the
95
bankruptcy process.

Essentially, Professor Lubben argues that the Chrysler and GM §
363 sales represent business as usual in a Chapter 11 setting, in which
there are limited prospects for saving the debtor from liquidation.
True enough. A debtor in bankruptcy admittedly has limited choices
if it desires to remain extant. In fact, Professor Lubben’s argument, a
more positive view, may be in line with the majority position.

perniciously. These are neither small nor simply fairness-based
considerations: capital markets depend on effective mechanisms that
prevent financial majorities from ousting financial minorities from
their ratable position in an enterprise.
Id. at 771.
92
See Lubben, supra note 82, at 535.
93
See Kuney, Misinterpreting, supra note 79, at 235. Professor Kuney observes:
Seemingly slight misinterpretations can dramatically alter an entire
statutory scheme. Like small cracks along a rock face, these slight
imperfections provide toeholds for roots, ice, wind and water that will
eventually erode the entire surface. Courts faced with interpretation of
Bankruptcy Code § 363(f) prove this to be all too true. Multiple
misinterpretations of this subsection of the Code have been repeatedly
committed.
Id.
94
See Roe & Skeel, supra note 82, at 771 (“Going forward, the extent of Chrysler’s
damage to bankruptcy practice and financial markets will depend either on
congressional action or on how Chrysler is construed by other courts, and whether
they will limit its application, as they should.”).
95
Lubben, supra note 82, at 538 (footnotes omitted).
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However, the incremental process erosions observed by critics of §
363 sales may be slowly and invidiously creating a new sense of the
ordinary course—a set of circumstances that merits attention.
In fact, a close reading of Professor Lubben’s work is not
inconsistent with this slippery slope argument. In a recent piece for
The New York Times DealBook, he describes a more recent § 363 sale
(for Claim Jumper Restaurants, LLC) proposed to be completed in a
96
compacted time frame. He sees this as more evidence that Chrysler
and GM represent mainstream Chapter 11 proceedings, concluding
that “[u]ltimately, only Congress can decide if this is a proper use of
97
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.” In closing, he then reaffirms
that “Chrysler and G.M. did little to change the bankruptcy
landscape, save for alerting the public to the reality that is modern
98
Chapter 11 practice.” The main question debated by Professors Roe
and Skeel, on the one hand, and Professor Lubben, on the other, is
whether the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies represent a watershed
that has the capacity to change the Chapter 11 process (Roe and
Skeel) or whether Chrysler and GM are just one among a series of
similarly situated § 363 sale cases over a ten-year period (Lubben).
Neither side in the debate appears to be conceding.
In the world of corporate finance, however, it may be of no
moment whether Professor Lubben is correct in his observations and
analysis or whether Professors Roe and Skeel have the better
argument. In accordance with the semi-strong version of the efficient
capital market hypothesis, the market reacts to publicly available
99
information, and the overwhelming tenor of publicly available
96
Stephen J. Lubben, A Bankruptcy Sale That Echoes G.M. and Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK
(Sept.
28,
2010,
3:47
PM),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/a-bankruptcy-sale-that-echoes-g-mand-chrysler.
97
Id. No doubt Professors Roe and Skeel would characterize the Claim Jumper
Restaurant proceeding as evidence of their foretold change in Chapter 11 practice
heralded by the Chrysler and GM cases.
98
Id.
99
Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 176–77
(2006).
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (the ECMH) posits that
efficient securities markets rapidly and accurately incorporate all
relevant available information into the market price of any given
security. The theory assumes that market prices react immediately to
each new bit of public information that becomes available, and
therefore, the price of securities is always a reflection of their fair,
intrinsic value.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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information regarding the Chrysler and GM bankruptcies indicates
that certain creditors with bargained-for priority positions were
unfairly disadvantaged in the process in a manner inconsistent with
100
the letter or intent of the Chapter 11 process. Moreover, different
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have different ways of preventing
reorganization plans from being effectuated through a § 363 sale,
creating the real possibility for unequal treatment among the
101
different circuits.
It may be the appearance or perception of
unfairness or inequity that creates market effects, rather than any
reality that may be ascertainable by legal scholars or bankruptcy
practitioners. Accordingly, absent congressional or judicial clarity,
consistency and transparency about the extent to which a § 363 sale
can adjust the priority position of creditors in Chapter 11
proceedings may provide some relief from adverse market effects by
giving the process an air of predictability.
Yet this consistency and transparency may be hard to achieve
when the federal government (as an actual or potential investor), as
well as Article II and Article III judges, has power over a debtor’s
reorganization plan. The government can be a game-changer. In
short, “[a]lthough the U.S. government rarely steps in to rescue
private enterprises, it wields enormous power and influence when it
102
does.” Many therefore may wonder, as Professor Todd Zywicki did
103
in his passionate opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal, whether
the government’s leverage creates more long-lasting effects on the
rule of law as it relates to corporate finance.
By stepping over the bright line between the rule of law and the
arbitrary behavior of men, President Obama may have created a
thousand new failing businesses. That is, businesses that might
have received financing before but that now will not, since
lenders face the potential of future government confiscation. In
other words, Mr. Obama may have helped save the jobs of
thousands of union workers whose dues, in part, engineered his

100

Interestingly, however, some major financial players are cautiously optimistic
that secured lenders are not in peril. See Moody’s: Secured Lenders Shouldn’t Fear
Chrysler Precedent, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 22, 2009, 6:05 PM),
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/moodys-secured-lenders-shouldntfear-chrysler-precedent.
101
See Lubben, supra note 82, at 533–34.
102
James M. Lawniczak, When the Business of Government Is Business: The U.S. Auto
Industry and the Future of Government Bailouts, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Mar. 26, 2010,
available at http://www.turnaround.org/Publications/Articles.aspx?objectId=12653.
103
Todd J. Zywicki, Chrysler and the Rule of Law, WALL ST. J., May 13, 2009, at A19.
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election. But what about the untold number of job losses in the
104
future caused by trampling the sanctity of contracts today?

Along similar lines, Professor Benjamin Templin has expressed
policy concerns emanating from constitutional principles and
political economic theory.
The Obama administration’s political maneuvering violated the
spirit of the U.S. Constitution given the implicit moral principles
supporting contract and property rights found within the
document. From a political economy perspective, Government
interference with contractual and property rights fundamentally
opposes one of the four primary institutional norms of a
successful entrepreneurial economy. If entrepreneurs cannot rely
on the support of the government to enforce contractual rights,
then they will be less willing to take risks in starting new
105
companies.

Professor Templin goes on to validate specifically the concern raised
in this Part that the government’s heavy-handed intrusion in the
Chrysler bankruptcy process has the propensity to impact capital
markets.
The government led effort that reduced bondholder rights is
expected to make the private equity firms more cautious about
lending money to politically powerful companies. Future lenders
to such firms will be wary of whether their investment will be
protected during a potential bankruptcy. The cost of capital for
such companies will rise in such circumstances making them less
106
competitive with foreign car companies.

And Professor Richard Epstein adds his voice to the robust chorus.
The entire structure of large credit markets . . . depends on
following the rules of the game to the letter. We have already
seen that market melt down. Add in bad bankruptcy rules and
the risks get larger. Memories are long in credit markets, and in
the worst-case scenario the pricing of every major deal could be
impacted if deviant bankruptcies become the norm. Let’s hope
that Chrysler and GM prove to be one-off concoctions borne of
107
desperation. But don’t bet on it yet.

So far, capital markets have survived the Chrysler and GM
bankruptcies. The actual long-term effects of the U.S. government’s
104

Id.
Templin, supra note 49, at 44 (footnotes omitted).
106
Id. at 45 (footnotes omitted).
107
Richard A. Epstein, Political Bankruptcies: How Chrysler and GM Have Changed the
Rules of the Game, FREEMAN, Dec. 2009, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/
featured/political-bankruptcies-how-chrysler-and-gm-have-changed-the-rules-of-thegame.
105
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directorial role in these Chapter 11 proceedings on corporate
finance remain to be seen. However, economic theory and analysis
portend possible shock waves in the capital markets, in particular if
participants in corporate finance transactions suffer or perceive
unchecked violations of the legal or normative rules of engagement.
Every investor knows that issuers get to re-write financial instruments
in Chapter 11; but they also have a sense of how far that process can
go. At some level of unpredictability, the players will inevitably lose
confidence and leave the game.
IV. REGULATION THROUGH INFLUENCE OVER MERGER AND
ACQUISITION ACTIVITY
The U.S. government’s influence over two key crisis-driven
108
mergers—as a shadow investor of sorts —is further evidence of its
regulation through corporate finance. As the guarantor of a lastminute, short-term loan by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMorgan) to
Bear Stearns Co. (Bear Stearns), the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York essentially brokered and compelled the sale of Bear Stearns to
109
JPMorgan in March 2008. Similarly, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) used its regulatory control over Wachovia
Corporation (Wachovia), supported in the end by favorable decisions
of the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission, to
(eventually) ordain the acquisition of Wachovia by Wells Fargo &
Company (Wells Fargo), even though the FDIC initially supported
110
Citigroup’s bid for Wachovia.
Absent this unorthodox federal intervention, each of these
transactions, effectuated by ordinary, state-law mergers, typically
would be privately negotiated and documented to comply with laws of
the states of incorporation of the parties, the law governing the
108

Professors Davidoff and Zaring describe the government’s role in the
JPMorgan/Bear Stearns merger as “a deal-making middleman, a traditional role for
investment bankers.” Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 2, at 538.
109
See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 138–39; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to
Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of
Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 717–18 (2009); Edward Pekarek & Michela Huth, Bank
Merger Reform Takes an Extended Philadelphia National Bank Holiday, 13 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 595, 695 (2008); Templin, supra note 49, at 89; Robin Sidel et al., J.P.
Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, As Fed Widens Credit to Avert Crisis, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,
2008, at A1.
110
See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 260–63; Frank A. Hirsch, Jr. & Joseph S. Dowdy,
Whither Wachovia? Wells Fargo Wins The Battle For The Storied North Carolina Banking
Institution, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 167, 169, 177-80 (2009); Press Release, Associated
Press, Fed Approves Wells Fargo’s Wachovia Acquisition (Oct. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,436661,00.html.
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various aspects of the transaction, applicable stock exchange rules,
and other pertinent bodies of regulation (including, in these two
cases, federal securities regulation, antitrust regulation, and banking
regulation). There are indicia of customary corporate finance
transactions in both mergers. For example, the JPMorgan/Bear
Stearns transaction included a stock lock-up (albeit on somewhat
111
non-standard terms).
The Wells Fargo/Wachovia transaction
included a purchase by Wells Fargo of a new series of Wachovia
voting-preferred stock in exchange for shares of Wells Fargo common
112
stock.
Each merger agreement included a “force-the-vote”
provision (which required, in each case, repeated submissions of the
113
merger to shareholders for a vote over a fixed period of time).
Yet, the Bear Stearns and Wachovia mergers jumbled the typical
separation of market-driven agreements on normative terms and the
regulatory overlay for the transaction. For example, the U.S.
Department of the Treasury (Treasury Department) refused to
finance an acquisition of Bear Stearns by J.C. Flowers & Co. LLC,
preferring instead to push JPMorgan to offer Bear Stearns a low price
(as a way of impeding future moral hazard in the financial services
114
sector) and accept related financial assistance.
In the case of
Wachovia, the Chairman of the FDIC selected the initial favored
acquiror (Citigroup) and allowed for the intervention of the
115
eventual-blessed acquiror (Wells Fargo).
Neither transaction
occurred in a typical arm’s length environment, and neither
transaction complied with the elements of good corporate finance
procedures for approvals undertaken for financial institution mergers

111

See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 142–43; Kahan & Rock, supra note 109, at 718.
See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 261. This preferred stock issuance relied on
blank check authority in Wachovia’s articles of incorporation (as a North Carolina
corporation) and (according to the related agreement) a waiver of the NYSE
shareholder approval rule. See id. at 261. See generally supra Parts II.A & B (discussing
blank check authority and the NYSE shareholder approval rule, respectively). On
the latter point, however, I note that the new series of preferred stock (Series M) is
not convertible into common stock and (therefore) may not have triggered
shareholder approval requirements under the NYSE rule. See Wachovia Corp.,
Articles of Amendment (Form 8-K) at Ex. 3.1 (Oct. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/36995/000119312508213052/dex31.htm
(Articles of Amendment establishing the Series M, Class A preferred Stock); supra
note 35 and accompanying text.
113
See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 141, 261.
114
See id. at 139; Pekarek & Huth, supra note 109, at 605; Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary
Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson's Choice
During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 682 (2010).
115
See id. at 261–62.
112
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and acquisitions outside a financial-crisis environment. Shareholder
117
allegations of unlawful terms and breaches of fiduciary duty ensued.
This intermixing of public regulation and private deal-making
118
disrupts the market for corporate control.
In theory, members of
the acquiror’s and target’s management, not government regulators,
are the best-equipped people to negotiate a full and fair price and
appropriate terms for the benefit of the target’s shareholders when
119
the target is to be sold.
The key question . . . is whether the government or some
governmentally appointed agent of the public interest can
distinguish, in advance, between individual transactions that will
be good and those that will be bad for the economy. Can the
government determine whether a merger will work out in the
efficient and profitable way that the parties are betting it will? We
think it is clear that the government is incapable of making that
120
judgment.

By forcing transactions, picking transaction partners, and defining or
constraining transactional terms, the U.S. government may be
mandating or fostering business combination transactions, capital
structures, and management teams that do not enhance shareholder
value or provide additional benefits to other corporate
constituencies. Consider, for example, the Treasury Department’s

116
See Memorandum from Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Courts
Uphold Sales of Wachovia and Bear Stearns: What the Financial Crisis Has Brought
Together, Let No Judge Put Asunder (Jan. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.ffhsj.com/siteFiles/Publications/195087EE5830C30A790D5B34530FF2E
C.pdf.
117
See Hirsch & Dowdy, supra note 110, at 181–91; Kahan & Rock, supra note 109,
at 720–21.
118
Jonathan R. Macey, The Politization of American Corporate Governance, 1 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 10, 25–26 (2006) (“The market for corporate control is a pure market
process. Government intervention is not needed to correct structural defects in this
market. Rather, regulatory intervention, when it occurs, reflects the efforts of special
interest groups . . . .”); Richard S. Ruback, Law and Economics: An Economic View of the
Market for Corporate Control, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 613, 613–14 (1984) (“The market for
corporate control is the arena in which management teams compete for the right to
manage resources. In this managerial competition model of the market for corporate
control, management teams are the activists . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
119
Id. at 616 (“Ignoring conflict of interest problems, the evaluation by the
incumbent management team is most efficient since they are likely to have the best
information set. Since the incumbent management team typically wants to retain its
position, it is unlikely that it would approve a merger at less than the full value of the
target firm.”).
120
Douglas H. Ginsburg & John F. Robinson, The Case Against Federal Intervention
in the Market for Corporate Control, BROOKINGS REV., Winter/Spring 1986, at 9, 11.
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low-price mandate in the JPMorgan/Bear Stearns merger.
The
government’s involvement suppressed market-based competition
between management teams. As a result of shareholder and
employee dissatisfaction with the low deal price, JPMorgan increased
the merger consideration from two dollars per share to ten dollars
122
per share. Of course, these facts evidence both the lack of market
involvement in the initial price setting and the market’s eventual,
albeit limited, power (through shareholder intervention) to force
price modification.
The government’s influence in the Bear Stearns and Wachovia
transactions represents a rare, but non-exclusive, way in which
123
government impacts the market for corporate control.
Through
antitrust, securities, and corporate law, federal and state governments
routinely rebalance the market for corporate control. Yet as is true in
the Chapter 11 context addressed in Part III of this Article, the
federal government’s influence as a non-regulatory player in mergers
and acquisitions transactions is less transparent and predictable,
raising concerns about potential effects on broad markets and the
potential for opportunistic abuses of power.
V. CONCLUSION
In the government’s actions are . . . lessons for deal-making and
deals. It is an incredible illustration of the potential for dealmaking. In pushing the limits of the law, the government has
created precedent for extreme deal-making situations. This is
precedent not only for future government action to stem systemic
124
panic, but also for private dealmakers structuring deals.

The U.S. government’s investment in private enterprise in
response to the financial crisis provides valuable opportunities to
make important observations useful to corporate finance practice.
For example, the U.S. government’s preferred stock purchases
highlight the utility of blank check preferred stock as an essential
predicate to last-minute equity financings while at the same time
casting light on drafting weaknesses in charter provisions conferring

121

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 146; Pekarek & Huth, supra note 109, at 697.
123
See George Bittlingmayer, The Market For Corporate Control (Including Takeovers),
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 725, 732 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds. 1996–2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5640book.pdf (“The
federal government may interfere with the transfer of control on various grounds.”).
124
See DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 247.
122
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blank check authority.
Moreover, exceptions to the NYSE
shareholder approval rules granted to AIG (and others) afford us
with more information about the confluence of circumstances that
may excuse the need for stockholder approval of large stock
issuances. In addition, the varied terms of the U.S. government’s
preferred stock investments constitute a prominent reminder of the
relatively flexible, contractual nature of preferred stock as a financing
and regulatory tool. It is incumbent upon and beneficial to drafters
of corporate finance instruments to harness this flexible tool in
service of the client.
Similarly, the U.S. government’s interference in private
enterprise during the financial crisis offers us opportunities to reflect
on interconnections between bankruptcy process and corporate
finance—or more specifically, capital markets. The costs associated
with the short-form § 363 sales used in the Chrysler and GM
bankruptcies may discourage capital investment. The reality of these
costs may be less important than the public perception of them in
creating adverse market effects. Accordingly, absent changes in the
law that curtail or prevent the re-writing of the process involved in §
363 sales, enhanced consistency in and transparency about the
appropriate use of the § 363 sale process by and at the behest of the
U.S. government and others will be necessary to minimize market
disruptions.
Corporate finance counsel are well advised to
understand the bankruptcy process in representing both issuers and
investors, so that bankruptcy risk may be more accurately assessed
and priced.
Finally, the U.S. government’s influence over private enterprise
during the financial crisis disrupts the market for corporate control
that drives a segment of the mergers and acquisitions market. By
interceding in what otherwise would be privately negotiated mergers
and acquisitions, the U.S. government challenges mergers and
acquisitions law and norms and changes the nature of mergers and
acquisitions practice. Governmental interventions in mergers and
acquisitions may result in mispriced, mistimed, or otherwise
suboptimal transactions and may perpetuate or proliferate the kind
of poor corporate management and substandard stock performance
that contributed to the severity of the financial crisis.
The bottom line? The U.S. government both used and
subverted corporate finance instruments and transactions in rescuing
numerous systemically important firms during the recent financial
crisis. As a result, corporate finance drafting and practice has been
thrust into the spotlight. The high visibility of corporate finance
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drafting and practice enables us to more clearly identify and correct
flawed or inferior provisions in corporate finance instruments and
contracts, to better evaluate the need for shareholder approvals in
difficult economic times and for specific issuers, and to focus on the
creative use of the malleable, contractual nature of preferred stock in
non-normative and normative corporate finance situations. In
addition, federal incursions into bankruptcy and mergers and
acquisitions practice are forcing corporate finance scholars and
practitioners to rethink both the theory and practical realities of
corporate finance in these contexts.
The overall presence of the federal government as a player in
the game of corporate finance also has broader ramifications.
Investor confidence in our capital markets depends, in part, on the
certainty and predictability of corporate finance instruments and
transactions. As examples included in this Article and elsewhere
illustrate, U.S. government investment and interference in and
influence over private enterprise decreases this certainty and
predictability. A lack of consistency and transparency enhances this
125
effect.
“Government by deal at times appeared to reduce
126
More significant or long-term
confidence in the markets.”
government participation in corporate finance transactions—in

125

See Barbara Black, The U.S. as a Reluctant Shareholder: Government, Business, and
the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 28–29),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646943
(“[M]embers of the public understandably want greater transparency, in order to
assess for themselves how these uneasy alliances between government and business
are working out.”).
Transparency may be especially important where the
government is a shareholder.
In a corporation in which the government has taken a substantial
equity interest, however, members of the general public have reason
for concern, for this is an extraordinary situation in which all U.S.
taxpayers have a sizable stake. It is also understandable that, given the
unusual situation, the public would be confused or mistrustful of
government intervention. Under these circumstances, the government
should work with management for maximum transparency consistent
with protecting the corporation’s legitimate needs for confidentiality.
Id. at 29.
126
DAVIDOFF, supra note 1, at 269. Professor Templin also makes this point:
If the state, rather than market forces, determines winners and losers,
some firms gain a competitive edge not based on efficiency and
prudent management but on political influence and bargaining. Such
political interference can have consequences for the political economy
as a whole since private investors may become reluctant to participate
in some ventures if they know the state is going to interfere.
Templin, supra note 49, at 38–39 (footnote omitted).
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whatever form or forms it may take—may have a destabilizing effect
on capital markets and therefore should not be undertaken lightly.

